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1 Introduction
In symmetric evolutionary games, it is well established that an evolutionary stable
strategy (ESS) is a Nash equilibrium isolated in the set of symmetric Nash equilibria.
When turning to asymmetric games, Selten (1980) showed that every ESS must be a
pure Nash equilibrium. Strictly mixed-strategy Nash equilibria are not asymptotically
stable (as proven in Hofbauer and Sigmund 1998, under the replicator dynamics, or
in Samuelson and Zhang 1992, under a more general setting). Consequently, each
type of player must use one of the pure strategies. This is a somewhat unsatisfactory
result since many games do not have an equilibrium in pure strategies, and so an ESS
does not exist for such games.1 As commented by Samuelson and Zang (1992) much
of the literature on equilibrium refinement is based on the assumption that there are
interesting equilibria which are not strict.
This paper proposes a new setting in between a symmetric evolutionary model
and an asymmetric one. Two populations of individuals are considered. Players from
the two populations share the same strategy set and interact among each other. The
game differs from a symmetric game in which all Sanchos would only interact among
each other but not with Quixotes (and vice versa). Also the current model differs from
the classical asymmetric game2 where Sanchos would interact with Quixotes but not
with Sanchos (and vice versa). More importantly, when a player receives a revision
opportunity, he can compare his payoff by random matching with individuals from
his same population, but also with individuals from the other population. Under this
specification, there exists a unique mixed-strategy asymptotically stable equilibrium.
In particular, in one population agents follow a pure strategy, while agents in the other
population play mixed strategies.
To illustrate this game, we assume two types of individuals confronted with a
social dilemma, such as the compliance with social norms. Dawes (1975) defines a
social dilemma as a situation in which: “(1) each person has available a dominating
strategy, and (2) the collective choice of dominating strategies results in a deficient
outcome”. Later on, Liebrand (1983) stated that: “Dawes’s requirement of a dominat-
ing strategy for each person does not appear to be crucial for considering a situation
a social dilemma. What is critical is that a strategy can be chosen that ultimately
results in an outcome that is deficient for all persons involved, and that nonetheless
can be attractive since in some circumstances that strategy yields the best payoff
for the person choosing it”. We assume that the first group of individuals, standard
1 This is particularly so for non-trivial extensive form games, as stated by Mailath (1998).
2 Oprea et al. (2011) study a two-population snowdrift game in which row players play only column
players and vice versa. Other interesting asymmetric games are, for example, Antoci et al. (2009) and
(2012), in finance and environmental problems, or Antoci et al. (2011), in traffic congestion.
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economic agents or Sanchos, perceive the social dilemma as a prisoner’s dilemma
(the most widely used paradigm to study human cooperation). In the other popula-
tion, Quixotes experience a higher utility from compliance and a stronger disutility
from defection. When the opponent complies, defection is still preferred, but if the
opponent defects, then compliance is the best strategy. Thus, for Quixotes, the com-
pliance dilemma is relaxed, and is described as a snowdrift or chicken game (see, for
example, Doebeli et al. 2004).
For a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game, mutual defection is the only Nash equi-
librium. By contrast, the snowdrift game presents a Nash equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies (and two asymmetric pure Nash equilibria). Correspondingly, for a single popu-
lation evolutionary game, the share of compliant agents in a prisoner’s dilemma game
vanishes at the equilibrium, while it converges towards a mixed strategy at which
some individuals defect while others comply, in the snowdrift game.
The novelty of our two-population evolutionary game is twofold. It considers
that agents in one population play a game against agents in both populations (inter-
population interaction). Moreover, when a player receives a revision opportunity he
can be matched with an agent within his own population (as it is standard in multi-
population games3), but can also be matched with an agent in the other population.
When matched, they exchange information about each other’s payoff, but they do
not acknowledge whether the opponent is of the same type or belongs to the other
population. The basis for inter-population imitation is to assume that an agent knows
his payoff (associated with his current strategy), while also learning the strategy of
another agent with whom he is randomly paired. Moreover, he gets imperfect infor-
mation about the payoff to this agent. Assuming they play different strategies, the
more dissimilar the payoffs, the more likely the agents are to perceive this dissimi-
larity, and the greater the probability that the player with lower payoff changes his
strategy. Thus, individuals belonging to one population interact with, and imitate,
agents within their own population as well as individuals in the opposite population.
In our setting, we characterize the condition under which there always exists a
unique mixed-strategy asymptotically stable fixed point of the evolutionary dynam-
ics. This equilibrium can be of two types. Firstly, if Quixotes are considerably dif-
ferent from Sanchos, especially when there is a larger payoff associated with com-
pliance rather than a stronger penalty to defection, then all Quixotes comply together
with some Sanchos. A pure strategy (compliance) is played in the population of
3 See, for example, Sandholm (2010). The mean dynamic for a multi-population game is presented in
Chapter 4, page 124, for the general case, and in Chapter 5, page 153, for the imitative dynamics. In the
standard setting, the evolutionary dynamics in one population depends on the payoffs matrix within this
specific population and the compliance rate in all populations.
4 Francisco Cabo, Ana Garcı´a-Gonza´lez
Quixotes, while a mixed-strategy equilibrium characterizes the population of San-
chos. Secondly, under the alternative condition, Quixotes partially comply, while San-
chos never comply. Hence, again one population is characterized by a pure strategy
(defection) and the other population is characterized by mixed strategies. Although
the two equilibria are asymptotically stable, they are not necessarily Nash equilib-
ria. This occurs because the inter-population imitation leads some individuals in one
population to “mistakenly” imitate agents from the other population, even though it
is not necessarily in their best interest. In the first type of equilibrium Sanchos com-
ply above their Nash equilibrium as they imitate the compliant behavior of Quixotes.
Correspondingly, in the second type, Quixotes comply below their Nash equilibrium
because they imitate the defecting behavior of Sanchos.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the two-population
evolutionary game, assuming inter-population interaction and imitation. It studies two
examples introducing the two alternative equilibria. Section 3 describes the general
model, characterizes the two type of equilibrium and proves their asymptotic stabil-
ity. Furthermore, it compares these stable equilibria to the unstable Nash equilibrium.
Section 4 provides conclusions. Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Inter-population interaction and imitation: a two-population game
This section describes a two-population evolutionary game involving two type of
individuals: Sanchos and Quixotes. The two populations have the same strategy set,
and they differ on their preferences or payoff matrices. As an example, we consider
a collective action problem such as the compliance with social norms. Each player is
better off if all players follow the rules, although there is an incentive to defect and
enjoy the benefits provided by the compliance of others.
For the population of Sanchos, the collective action problem is represented in the
canonical way as a prisoner’s dilemma game, where players decide between compli-
ance and defection. For example, consider the following the payoff matrix:
C D
C (10, 10) (0, 20)
D (20, 0) (1, 1)
(S-I)
These agents have an incentive to defect, regardless of what the opponent chooses.
Under this prisoner’s dilemma specification, compliance is dominated by defection
and the unique Nash equilibrium is mutual defection.
In addition to this type of agent, we also take into account a second population,
named Quixotes, with different payoffs. Compared to Sanchos, these individuals re-
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ceive a greater payoff for compliance (7 more units) and a lower payoff for defection
(2 less units), with the following payoff matrix:
C D
C (17, 17) (7, 18)
D (18, 7) (−1,−1)
(Q-I)
This matrix still represents a social dilemma, because Quixotes still have an incentive
to defect when others comply (18 > 17). Nonetheless, the main characteristic that
differentiates Quixotes from Sanchos is that the former prefer to be the sole individual
who complies over mutual defection (7 > −1). Therefore, the problem for these
players is not characterized by the prisoner’s dilemma, but by a snowdrift or chicken
game. This game has two asymmetric pure Nash equilibria, (1, 0), (0, 1) and one
symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium4 (∆, 1−∆) = (8/9, 1/9).
A population game defined exclusively for the population of Sanchos would be
characterized by the convergence towards an ESS of zero compliance. Similarly, for
a population of Quixotes, the compliance rate at the equilibrium would be ∆.
To define the two-population game, we assume a unit mass population divided
between Sanchos and Quixotes. For simplicity we assume a 1/2 mass of Sanchos and
an equal 1/2 mass of Quixotes. Denoting by p the ratio of agents in the population
of Sanchos who comply, and by q the ratio of compliant Quixotes, the set of social
states can be written as X = {x = (p, 1− p, q, 1− q)/2 : p ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ [0, 1]}. For
each social state, the payoff function for the two-population game can be defined as
a function5 of the state x, or simply as a function of the share of the total population
who complies (adding up Sanchos and Quixotes), y = (p+ q)/2:
1
2

10 0 10 0
20 1 20 1
17 7 17 7
18 −1 18 −1


p
1− p
q
1− q
=

10y
19y + 1
10y + 7
19y − 1
≡

piSC(y)
piSD(y)
piQC (y)
piQD(y)
 = pi(y). (1)
This share determines the payoff of an agent in population h ∈ {S,Q} playing strat-
egy i ∈ {C,D}, denoted as pihi (y). The 4 × 4 matrix in (1) shows that individuals
in one population interact with agents from their own population and agents from the
other population. A standard symmetric two-population evolutionary game would
be characterized by a block diagonal matrix. Correspondingly, an asymmetric game
would be associated with a matrix whose main diagonal blocks are zero matrices.
4 At this equilibrium, the expected payoff associated with compliance equates the expected payoff as-
sociated with defection.
5 Superscripts S and Q refer to Sanchos and Quixotes, and subscripts C and D refer to compliance and
defection.
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From expression (1) it follows that Quixotes get 7 more units from compliance
and 2 less units from defection than Sanchos, regardless of the social state, i.e. regard-
less of the compliance rate in the total population, y. Moreover, the payoff function
in (1) clearly states that piSD(y) − piSC(y) = 9y + 1 > 0, ∀q ∈ [0, 1], and therefore
defection always dominates compliance in the population of Sanchos. For Quixotes,
piQD(y) − piQC (y) = 9y − 8 and only a large compliance rate in the overall population,
y > 8/9, makes defection more rewarding than compliance. By contrast, as more
individuals defect (y decays below 8/9), the incentive to defect is outweighed by the
damage associated with mutual defection. The threshold is the Nash equilibrium in
mixed strategies if only a single population of Quixotes existed: piQC (y) ≷ piQD(y) if
and only if y ≶ ∆ ≡ 8/9.
Next we specify a dynamic model which explains how each agent reconsiders his
strategy choice. We will consider an imitative revision protocol as the updating pro-
cedure, specifically, pairwise proportional imitation. An interesting property of the
imitative dynamics is that it admits rest points that are not Nash equilibria.6 More im-
portantly, the particular setting proposed will make a mixed-strategy asymptotically
stable rest point possible. At the equilibrium, agents do not necessarily play pure
strategies. Moreover, this equilibrium is not a Nash equilibrium.
An imitative revision protocol: Pairwise proportional imitation:
The dynamics governing the evolution of the compliance rates among Sanchos
and Quixotes stem from an imitative revision protocol. The dynamics of the com-
pliance rate for Sanchos, p˙, is equal to the share of defecting Sanchos, 1 − p, times
the probability that a defecting Sancho switches to compliance, ρSDC, minus the share
of compliant Sanchos, p, times the probability that a compliant Sancho switches to
defection, ρSCD:
p˙ = (1− p)ρSDC − pρSCD. (2)
Likewise, the dynamics of the ratio of compliant Quixotes can be written as
q˙ = (1− q)ρQDC − qρQCD. (3)
The two-population game analyzed here differs from the standard formulation in
the sense that players in one population interact with and also imitate players of their
own kind but also players in the other population. Inter-population interaction and
imitation is feasible based on three assumptions. First, the two populations involved
have the same strategy set: compliance and defection {C,D} (only with different
6 See Sandholm (2010), Chapter 5, subsection 5.4.6, page 164. As examples, the state at which all
Quixotes and all Sanchos comply, or the state at which no agent in either population complies are rest
points and not Nash equilibria.
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payoffs). Second, individuals think that they belong to an homogeneous single pop-
ulation. And third, each individual knows the specific payoff associated with his cur-
rent strategy, and learns the strategy and gets imperfect information about the payoff
to another player he is randomly paired with. To explain the inter-population inter-
action and imitation, assume that an individual in the population of Sanchos who
currently complies receives a revision opportunity. If he is paired with a defecting
Sancho, which happens with probability (1 − p)/2, he would acknowledge that his
opponent gets a higher payoff and would be willing to switch to defection. This will-
ingness is known as the conditional imitation rate and is denoted by rSSCD. However,
contrary to the standard two-population evolutionary game, he could also be paired
with a defecting Quixote, with probability (1 − q)/2. He knows his current payoff,
and becomes aware of his opponent’s. Not knowing that they have different prefer-
ences/payoff matrices,7 the Sancho would be willing to abandon compliance if he
acknowledges that the defecting Quixotes gets a higher payoff (i.e. the conditional
imitation rate rSQCD is positive). Thus, the conditional switch rate from compliance to
defection in the population of Sanchos has two terms:
ρSCD =
1− p
2
rSSCD +
1− q
2
rSQCD.
Considering pairwise proportional imitation, the conditional imitation rate or the will-
ingness of an individual in population h playing strategy i to imitate an agent in pop-
ulation k playing strategy j, can be described as proportional to the gap between the
two payoffs if positive:8 rhkij = [pi
k
j − pihi ]+ where function [d]+ returns d if d > 0
or 0 otherwise. Taking this definition into account, and repeating the same reasoning,
the conditional imitation rates between strategies for the two populations read:
ρSCD =
1− p
2
rSSCD +
1− q
2
rSQCD =
1− p
2
(9y + 1) +
1− q
2
[9y − 1]+, (4)
ρQCD =
1− p
2
rQSCD +
1− q
2
rQQCD =
1− p
2
[9y − 6]+ + 1− q
2
[9y − 8]+, (5)
ρSDC =
p
2
rSSDC +
q
2
rSQDC =
q
2
[6− 9y]+, (6)
ρQDC =
p
2
rQSDC +
q
2
rQQDC =
p
2
[1− 9y]+ + q
2
[8− 9y]+. (7)
It is worth noticing that the switch rate from defection to compliance in the population
of Sanchos, given in (6), is not necessarily null as in the standard two-population
7 Only if a Sancho is paired with a Quixote and both play the same strategy would they realize that they
have different payoff matrices. However, this match will have no influence on the dynamics as there will
be no switch from one strategy to another.
8 The standard argument behind this assumption is the imperfect information concerning this gap. Thus,
the larger the difference in payoffs the more likely the agents perceive it and switch strategies. We drop
the y argument from functions pihi (y), pi
k
j (y) and consequently from function r
hk
ij (y), for simplicity.
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evolutionary game. A defecting Sancho never imitates a compliant Sancho, rSSDC = 0.
However, if the compliance rate in the global population is sufficiently small, y <
2/3, then a compliant Quixote obtains a payoff even higher than a defecting Sancho,
and the latter would feel inclined to comply if paired with the former, rSQDC > 0. This
opens up the possibility for an equilibrium with partial compliance among Sanchos.
From the described revision protocol and the dynamics in (2)-(3) one gets the
mean dynamics for the ratios of compliant Sanchos and Quixotes:
p˙ =
1− p
2
{prSSDC + qrSQDC} −
p
2
{(1− p)rSSCD + (1− q)rSQCD} , (8)
q˙ =
1− q
2
{qrQQDC + prQSDC} −
q
2
{(1− q)rQQCD + (1− p)rQSCD} . (9)
From (4)-(7) we can distinguish four regions for this dynamics within the interval
[0, 1]. In region I, with y ∈ (8/9, 1], no agent will switch from defection to compli-
ance. Within region II, with y ∈ (2/3, 8/9), rQQDC > 0 and defecting Quixotes will
switch to compliance but only when paired with compliant Quixotes. Within region
IIIα>1/2, with y ∈ (1/9, 2/3), rQQDC > 0, rSQDC > 0, and hence compliant Quixotes
will be imitated by defecting Quixotes and, more importantly, by defecting San-
chos. Finally, in region IV, with y ∈ [0, 1/9), compliance always pays more than
defection, except when two Sanchos are paired. Taking these regions into account,
the imitative dynamics (8)-(9) can be summarized in the phase diagram in Figure 1.
This figure shows the two unstable equilibria in pure strategies: complete compliance
among Sanchos and Quixotes, (p∗, q∗) = (1, 1), or defection in either population
(p∗, q∗) = (0, 0). Moreover, we observe a mixed-strategy asymptotically stable fixed
point of the dynamics in (p∗, q∗) = (0.141048, 1). This equilibrium is characterized
by Quixotes following a pure strategy (compliance), while the population of Sanchos
plays mixed strategies, complying 14% of the time. That is, an equilibrium with full
compliance among Quixotes and partial compliance among Sanchos.9
According to this example, inter-population interaction and imitation creates the
possibility that some Sanchos, who (in the standard two-population setting) would
never imitate compliant Sanchos, might now imitate compliant Quixotes. A mixed-
strategy equilibrium of the form q∗ = 1 and p∗ ∈ (0, 1) arises. However, the next ex-
ample highlights that inter-population interaction and imitation can lead to a mixed-
strategy equilibrium of a different type: q∗ ∈ (0, 1) and p∗ = 0. Assuming the payoff
matrix for Sanchos in S-I, consider a new type of Quixotes whose payoff matrix
reads:
9 To compute this mixed-strategy equilibrium, notice that in region IIIα>1/2, r
QQ
CD = r
QS
CD = 0 and
hence, q˙ = (1 − q){qrQQDC + prQSDC} /2 which is positive unless q reaches 1. When all Quixotes comply,
the dynamic equation for p, in (8), vanishes for a unique value satisfying that y remains in this region:
p∗ = 0.141048.
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p
q
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I
III
y=8/9
y=2/3
y=1/9
α>1/ 2
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fig. 1 Phase diagram in example S-I/Q-I.
C D
C (14, 14) (4, 15)
D (15, 4) (−4,−4)
(Q-II)
Again, Sanchos are characterized by a prisoner’s dilemma game and Quixotes by
a chicken game. This new type of Quixotes obtain 4 more units from compliance
(instead of 7) and 5 less units from defection (instead of 2). The new chicken game is
characterized by the same Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies,∆ = 8/9. Following
the same reasoning as in the previous example, the imitative dynamics is described
in the phase diagram in Figure 2. Together with the two unstable equilibria (1, 1) and
(0, 0), a mixed-strategy equilibrium is obtained at (p∗, q∗) = (0, 0.828956). In this
equilibrium, Sanchos follow a pure defecting strategy and Quixotes follow a mixed
strategy, complying 82% of the time. This equilibrium is characterized by partial
compliance among Quixotes and defection among Sanchos.
Note that although the compliance rate in the population of Sanchos is zero at
the equilibrium, it is not necessarily so along the whole trajectory towards the equi-
librium. As shown in Figure 2, starting from an initial situation of very low com-
pliance in both populations, compliant Quixotes are paid more than defecting San-
chos. Therefore, defecting Sanchos switch to compliance when paired with compliant
Quixotes. Nevertheless, this imitation process is of limited duration. As the global
compliance rate increases, the excess reward of compliant Quixotes progressively
disappears, leading the population of Sanchos towards defection.
The two examples lead to a unique mixed-strategy asymptotically stable fixed
point. In example S-I/Q-I, the population of Quixotes follows the compliance strategy
while Sanchos are characterized by a mixed strategy. Conversely, in example S-I/Q-
II, the population of Sanchos follows the defecting strategy while the behaviour of
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0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Fig. 2 Phase diagram in example S-I/Q-II
Quixotes is characterized by a mixed strategy. Next we analyze the conditions that
lead to one type of solution or the other in a general setting.
3 A general model
The payoff matrix for the population of Sanchos can be expressed as:
C D
C (1, 1) (1− d, 1 + c− d)
D (1 + c− d, 1− d) (1− φ, 1− φ)
This game has a prisoner’s dilemma structure under condition:
0 < φ < d < c. (10)
Furthermore, we also assume that defection is more strongly preferred if the opponent
complies: d− φ > c− d, or equivalently, σ = φ+ c− 2d > 0.
Quixotes obtain an excess reward from compliance, given by A ≥ 0, and a lower
payoff associated with defection, B ≥ 0. Hence, their payoff matrix is:
C D
C (1 +A, 1 +A) (1− d+A, 1 + c− d−B)
D (1 + c− d−B, 1− d+A) (1− φ−B, 1− φ−B)
We can interpret the term ε = A + B > 0, as a “quantitative” measure of the gap
between Sanchos and Quixotes. This measure adds together how much better compli-
ance is and how much worse defection is for Quixotes. ThenA andB can be rewritten
as A = αε and B = (1 − α)ε with α ∈ [0, 1]. The new parameter α is a “qualita-
tive” measure which discriminates between a great joy from compliance (α → 1) or
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a strong discomfort associated with transgression (α → 0). Thus, ε represents how
different the two population are, while α describes in which way they differ.
Under this specification, the snowdrift structure arises if defection is preferred
when the opponent complies, but not when the opponent also defects:
0 < d− φ < ε < c− d. (11)
Note that the example S-I/Q-I corresponds to the values d = 1, c = 2, φ = 9/10, ε =
9/10, α = 7/9, multiplying all payoffs by 10. And the example S-I/Q-II corresponds
to the same parameters values except for α = 4/9.
Following the same reasoning as in the two previous examples, when individuals
in one population play a game against individuals in their own as well as in the other
population, (i.e. under inter-population interaction), the 4×4 matrix:
1 1−d 1 1−d
1+c−d 1−φ 1+c−d 1−φ
1+αε 1−d+αε 1+αε 1−d+αε
1+c−d−(1−α)ε 1−φ−(1−α)ε 1+c−d−(1−α)ε 1−φ−(1−α)ε
,
determines the vector of payoffs:
pi(y) =

piSC(y)
piSD(y)
piQC (y)
piQD(y)
 =

1− d+ dy
1− φ+ y(φ+ c− d)
1− d+ dy + αε
1− φ+ y(φ+ c− d)− (1− α)ε
 . (12)
And next proposition computes the unique Nash equilibrium for this game.
Proposition 1 The Nash equilibrium of the two-population game involving Sanchos
and Quixotes, who share the same strategy set {C,D}, and with payoffs as described
in (12), is:10
(pNE, qNE) =
{
(0, 1) if ε ≥ c−φ2 ,
(0, 2∆) if ε < c−φ2 ,
∆ =
ε− (d− φ)
σ
. (13)
Proof The payoffs in (12) imply piSD(y) > pi
S
C(y), for all y ∈ [0, 1], and hence
compliance is a strictly dominated strategy for Sanchos. Thus at any state x =
(p, 1− p, q, 1− q), the best reaction function for Sanchos reads: BS(x) = (0, 1).
For Quixotes, computing the value of q at which piQD(y) = pi
S
C(y) for the expres-
sions in (12), the best reaction function can be written as: BQ(x) = (2(2∆− p), 1−
2(2∆−p)). From these two reaction functions, and the fact that qNE cannot be greater
than one, the Nash equilibrium in (13) follows.
10 For the parameters’ values above, the Nash equilibrium would be (pNE, qNE) = (0, 1).
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Under pairwise imitation, the imitative dynamics is governed by the differential
equations in (2) and (3), together with the swift rates between strategies defined by:
ρSCD =
1− p
2
[
y +
d− φ
σ
]
+
+
1− q
2
[y −∆2]+, (14)
ρQCD =
1− p
2
[y −∆1]+ +
1− q
2
[y −∆]+, (15)
ρSDC =
q
2
[∆1 − y]+, (16)
ρQDC =
p
2
[∆2 − y]+ + q
2
[∆− y]+. (17)
with
∆1 = ∆− (1− α) ε
σ
, ∆2 = ∆− α ε
σ
.
Note that ∆ ≥ max{∆1, ∆2} and ∆1 ≷ ∆2 when α ≷ 1/2.
The dynamics depends on the value of y and on how it compares to ∆, ∆1 and
∆2. Figure 3 defines five regions depending on the conditional imitation rates of
defecting h individuals paired with compliant k individuals, rhkDC , h, k ∈ {S,Q}.11
0 ∆2IV ∆1IIIα>1/2
∆II I 1
(
rSSDC r
SQ
DC
rQSDC r
QQ
DC
) (
0 +
+ +
) (
0 +
0 +
) (
0 0
0 +
) (
0 0
0 0
) (
α > 1
2
)
y
0 ∆1IV ∆2IIIα<1/2 ∆II I 1
(
rSSDC r
SQ
DC
rQSDC r
QQ
DC
) (
0 +
+ +
) (
0 0
+ +
) (
0 0
0 +
) (
0 0
0 0
) (
α < 1
2
)
y
Fig. 3 Conditional imitation rates from defection to compliance when α > 1/2 (up) or α < 1/2 (down).
In region I, p˙ < 0 if p ∈ (0, 1) and q˙ < 0 if q ∈ (0, 1), hence, an equilib-
rium with some compliance is not feasible in this region. The unstable equilibria
(p∗, q∗) = (1, 1) and (p∗, q∗) = (0, 0) lie in regions I and IV, respectively. A
11 In the interior of these intervals rhkDC > 0 ⇒ rkhCD = 0, and similarly rhkDC = 0 ⇒ rkhCD > 0,
for h, k ∈ {S,Q}. Consequently, the conditional imitation rates for compliant h individuals paired with
defecting k individuals can be immediately obtained by switching 0 by + (and vice versa), and transposing
the matrices in Figure 3.
Interaction and imitation in a world of Quixotes and Sanchos 13
mixed-strategy equilibrium with full compliance among Quixotes and partial compli-
ance among Sanchos (like in example S-I/Q-I) requires that some defecting Sanchos
switch to compliance when paired with compliant Quixotes, i.e. it requires rSQDC > 0,
or equivalently, y < ∆1. This corresponds to regions IV and IIIα>1/2 in Figure 3.
Conversely, an equilibrium with partial compliance among Quixotes and pure defec-
tion among Sanchos, requires the opposite condition: y > ∆1. This corresponds to
regions II and IIIα<1/2 in Figure 3. These two types of equilibrium are characterized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 2 The inter-population interaction and imitation makes possible a mixed-
strategy equilibrium of two types. Under condition
εα >
c− φ
2
, (18)
the equilibrium shows full compliance within the population of Quixotes, q∗SQ = 1,
and partial compliance within the population of Sanchos:12
p∗SQ =
−(c− d) +√(d− φ)2 + 2αεσ
σ
∈ (0, 1). (19)
Under the opposite condition
εα <
c− φ
2
, (20)
the equilibrium is characterized by defection within the population of Sanchos, p∗Q =
0, and partial compliance within the population of Quixotes:
q∗Q = 1 +∆−
√
(1−∆)2 + 2(1− α)ε/σ < 1. (21)
The equality εα = (c− φ)/2 would lead to a (p∗, q∗) = (0, 1) equilibrium with both
populations playing pure strategies: Quixotes compliance and Sanchos defection.
Proof See Appendix A.
Remark 1 To guarantee q∗Q > 0 in (21), condition (11) is strengthen to:
2
1 + α
(d− φ) < ε < c− d. (22)
The results collected in the two previous examples, and in Proposition 2 and Re-
mark 1 are gathered together in Figure 4, which depicts the equilibria in the ε − α
parameters’ space. The existence of an equilibrium with positive compliance requires
a sufficiently large absolute distance between Quixotes and Sanchos, given by the left
inequality in (22). In Figure 4, the shadow region down-left of the dashed line rep-
resents pairs (ε, α) for which this condition is not fulfilled and no equilibrium is
feasible.
12 Subscript SQ indicates that individuals from both populations comply. Subscript Q is used to high-
light that only Quixotes comply.
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Fig. 4 Distinct equilibria depending on ε and α, (c = 2, d = 1, φ = 9/10).
According to condition (18), some Sanchos can find it attractive to comply in
the case of inter-population interaction and imitation. This type of equilibrium, with
compliant Quixotes plus partially compliant Sanchos, is reached above and to the
right of the solid line in Figure 4. Example S-I/Q-I lies in this region (highlighted
by the dot I). The absolute distance between Sanchos and Quixotes, ε, should not
necessarily be too large if this difference focuses on greater payoffs for compliance,
i.e. if α approaches 1. But this absolute distance needs to be large when it mainly
implies stronger penalties from defection,13 α close to 0.
By contrast, condition (18) is reversed to (20), and the second type of equilibrium
emerges, below and to the left of of the solid line in Figure 4. In this equilibrium
only some Quixotes comply. It occurs when the absolute gap between Sanchos and
Quixotes is not excessively wide (ε small); and/or if this difference is biased towards
a stronger aversion to defection (α small). Example S-I/Q-II lies in this region (high-
lighted by the square II).
Remark 2 In the two types of equilibrium presented in Proposition 2, one population
plays a mixed strategy while the other population plays a pure strategy. Under our
formulation, a mixed-mixed equilibrium with p∗ ∈ (0, 1) and q∗ ∈ (0, 1), is not
feasible. If some Sanchos comply, it must be the case that all Quixotes do also comply.
And conversely, if some Quixotes defect, then no Sancho complies.
Proof From expression (19), condition p∗SQ > 0 is equivalent to αε > (c − φ)/2,
or condition (18). Similarly, from the definition in (21), the condition q∗Q < 1 is
equivalent to αε < (c − φ)/2, or the reverse of condition (20). Obviously the two
requirements cannot be fulfilled at the same time.
13 In fact, for the parameters’ values considered, it is not feasible for α < 1/2.
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To clarify this remark, assume an initial situation of (p, q) = (0, 1). If condition
(18) is satisfied, compliant Quixotes do better than defecting Sanchos or Quixotes.14
Therefore they never switch to defection: rQQCD = r
QS
CD = 0 and q remains equal to
q∗SQ = 1 . Moreover, since defecting Sanchos do worse than compliant Quixotes,
some of them will switch and imitate the compliant behavior of Quixotes, until the
share p∗SQ > 0.
Conversely, let us assume that at the same initial point (p, q) = (0, 1), the op-
posite condition (20) is satisfied. Then, defecting Sanchos do not imitate compliant
Quixotes (and they never imitate compliant Sanchos). The defecting Sanchos never
switch to compliance and p remains equal to p∗Q = 0. By contrast, compliant Quixotes
would switch and stop compliance when paired with defecting Sanchos. This explains
a compliance rate for Quixotes q∗Q < 1. As the share of compliant Quixotes decays,
so does their disadvantage with respect to defecting Sanchos. However, under con-
dition (20), defecting Sanchos still do better than compliant Quixotes even at the
equilibrium, piQC (q
∗
Q/2) < pi
S
D(q
∗
Q/2). Consequently, Sanchos still have no incentive to
abandon their dominant defecting strategy.
Proposition 2 and Remark 2 establish the existence of an equilibrium with one
population playing a mix strategy (and the other a pure strategy). Next proposition
states that this equilibrium is the unique stable equilibrium.
Proposition 3 The equilibrium (p∗SQ, 1) under condition (18), or (0, q∗Q ) under the
opposite condition (20), is the unique asymptotically stable fixed point of the evolu-
tionary dynamics.
Proof The stability of the equilibria can be tackled based on two approaches. A first
approach is the direct method of Lyapunov. Let’s denote by V (p, q, p∗, q∗, t) the eu-
clidean distance from (p, q) to the equilibrium (p∗, q∗) at time t, which is locally
positive definite (lpd) and decrescent. Then the equilibrium (p∗, q∗) would be uni-
formly locally asymptotically stable if −V˙ (p, q, p∗, q∗, t) is lpd.
We have computed functions −V˙ (p, q, p∗SQ, q∗SQ, t) for the example S-I/Q-I and
−V˙ (p, q, p∗Q , q∗Q , t) for the example S-I/Q-II. Although we cannot proof analytically
that these functions are lpd, it can be numerically inferred by plotting both functions.
Figure 5 shows the level curves for functions V˙ (p, q, p∗SQ, q
∗
SQ, t) and V˙ (p, q, p
∗
Q , q
∗
Q , t)
which only take negative values.
Moreover, it is easy to prove that condition
−V˙ ≡ −
(
∂V
∂p
,
∂V
∂q
)
· (p˙, q˙)′ > 0,
14 piQC (1/2) − piSD(1/2) = αε − (c − φ)/2. Then, under condition (18) it holds true that piQC (1/2) >
piSD(1/2). Moreover, it is always true that pi
S
D(y) > pi
S
C(y).
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Fig. 5 V˙ (p, q, pSQ, qSQ) and V˙ (p, q, pQ, qQ)
is equivalent to say that the direction of the dynamics makes an acute angle with the
direction pointing from the state (p, q) to the equilibrium (p∗, q∗). This is also clear
in the vector fields shown in Figures 1 and 2.
Local asymptotic stability of the two type of equilibrium can be analytically
proved considering the alternative approach of the Lyapunov indirect method. If the
linearized system around the equilibrium (p∗, q∗) is a uniformly asymptotically stable
equilibrium point, then (p∗, q∗) is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium point
of the dynamic system. For each equilibrium type, in Appendix B we prove that the
two eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix of the system of differential equations (within
the region where the equilibrium is located) are in the left half complex plane (have
negative real part).
Propositions 2 and 3 establish the existence of a unique stable equilibrium, given
by (p∗SQ, 1) under condition (18), or (0, q
∗
Q ) under the opposite condition (20). Next
proposition compares these two type of equilibrium to the unstable Nash equilibrium
in (13). This would be the asymptotically stable equilibrium in the case of inter-
population interaction but no inter-population imitation. That is, if individuals from
one population would only imitate individuals from their same population.
Proposition 4 Under condition (18), the asymptotically stable equilibrium, charac-
terized by compliant Quixotes and partially compliant Sanchos, satisfies: p∗SQ > p
NE =
0 and q∗SQ = q
NE = 1.
Under the opposite condition (20), the stable equilibrium, characterized by partially
compliant Quixotes and defecting Sanchos, satisfies: p∗Q = p
NE = 0 and q∗Q < q
NE.
Proof See Appendix C.
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Under condition (18), the asymptotically stable equilibrium is characterized by a pos-
itive share of Sanchos who imitate the compliant behavior of Quixotes, when their
payoff would be higher following the defecting strategy in their Nash equilibrium. In
this situation every individual in the population of Quixotes ends up complying, as it
is also marked by their Nash equilibrium.
By contrast, under the alternative condition (20), when only Quixotes comply,
they comply less than what they would have complied had the Nash equilibrium
be reached (i.e. without inter-population imitation). The reason is that there exists a
positive share of Quixotes which imitate the defecting behavior of Sanchos, when it
would be in their best interest not to do so. Under this condition, the population of
Sanchos follows its Nash equilibrium or dominant defecting strategy.
Remark 3 We can define the average payoffs for Sanchos and for Quixotes as:
p¯iS(p, q) = piSC(y)p+ pi
S
D(y)(1− p), p¯iQ(p, q) = piQC (y)q + piQD(y)(1− q).
Then, the asymptotically stable equilibrium under condition (18) provides a higher
average payoff to Quixotes, because Sanchos comply above the Nash equilibrium.
Likewise, under condition (20) Sanchos attain a smaller average payoff, because
Quixotes comply below the Nash equilibrium.
Proof See Appendix D.
4 Conclusions
The paper analyzes a social dilemma involving two types of individuals who share
the same strategy set and differ in their payoffs. For Sanchos, the game has a pris-
oner’s dilemma structure, and for Quixotes the dilemma is described as a snowdrift
game. If a one-population evolutionary game were assumed considering only San-
chos, the evolutionary dynamics would converge to the defecting Nash equilibrium
characteristic from a prisoner’s dilemma. By contrast, if the population was exclu-
sively composed of Quixotes, the evolutionary dynamics would converge towards an
equilibrium with positive shares of compliant and defecting Quixotes, defined by the
Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies of the snowdrift game.
Our approach analyzes the social dilemma as a two-population evolutionary game,
introducing a setting in between a symmetric evolutionary game and an asymmetric
evolutionary game. The game considers inter-population interaction and it randomly
pits players from a given population against themselves, as well as against agents
from the other population.
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Evolutionary dynamics is defined considering an imitative revision protocol, spe-
cifically, pairwise proportional imitation. In the standard two-population evolutionary
game, agents are only paired with individuals within their own population. If an indi-
vidual revising his strategy is paired with an individual of the same population play-
ing a different strategy, he will switch to this strategy with a conditional imitation
rate, as long as it provides a higher payoff. Our approach allows for the possibility
of inter-population imitation. Each individual knows the payoff associated with his
current strategy, learns the strategy of another player he is randomly paired with, and
gets imperfect information about this agent’s payoff. The wider the gap between the
payoffs, the clearer it is perceived, and the more likely a change in strategy. How-
ever, agents are unaware of the heterogeneity in payoffs, and ignore the existence of
two distinct populations. Thus, a revising agent imitates an alternative strategy when
played by either an individual within his own population or the other population.
Our main result is that the proposed setting makes possible stable mixed-strategy
equilibria, that need not be and indeed are not pure. Specifically, the imitative dynam-
ics admits two mixed-strategy asymptotically stable rest points: an equilibrium with
compliant Quixotes and partially compliant Sanchos, or an equilibrium with defect-
ing Sanchos and partially compliant Quixotes. In both types of equilibria, individu-
als in one population play a pure strategy, while individuals in the other population
are characterized by a mixed strategy. An equilibrium with full compliance among
Quixotes and partial compliance among Sanchos takes place if the excess reward that
Quixotes attain from compliance is large. That is, if Quixotes strongly differ from
Sanchos, and/or this difference focuses on greater payoffs from compliance rather
than greater penalties from defection. The equilibrium results in full defection among
Sanchos and partial compliance among Quixotes in the opposite case, when the two
populations are similar, or they differ mainly from a strong distaste for defection.
Furthermore, we also prove that the asymptotically stable equilibria are not Nash
equilibria. We observe that in the stable equilibrium in which only Quixotes comply,
they comply below the Nash equilibrium. Conversely, when also Sanchos comply,
they exceed the zero compliance under the Nash equilibrium.
We have presented the inter-population interaction and imitation as an extreme
setting opposed to the standard evolutionary game. In the latter, players have full
information on their own and their opponents payoff matrices. Conversely, we have
assumed that a player only knows his current payoff and the payoff of the player he is
paired with. An interesting extension might consider intermediate situations in which
individuals do not fully recognize, but neither do they completely fail to acknowl-
edge, the other individuals’ type. Consequently, a player in one population would
also imitate individuals from the other population, but to a lesser extent. A second in-
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teresting extension would be to consider that the population is not necessarily divided
in two equal halves between Sanchos and Quixotes.
Finally, we have considered a particular structure for the payoff matrix of Quixotes
with respect to Sanchos (higher reward to compliance and lower reward to defection).
Alternative specifications could give rise to different results. In particular, it would
be worthy to explore the possibility of a mixed-mixed equilibrium if Quixotes obtain
a higher reward from compliance and also from defection.
A Proof of Proposition 2
– Equilibrium under condition (18):
Since rSSDC = 0, the dynamics of the compliance share among Sanchos for q = 1 reads:
p˙ = (1− p)rSQDC − p(1− p)rSSCD = (1− p)σ
[
∆1 − y − p
(
y +
d− φ
σ
)]
.
Hence, taking into account that y = (1 + p)/2, then p˙/((1 − p)σ) is given by the second order
polynomial:
−p2 − 2p c− d
σ
+ 2
αε− (d− φ)
σ
− 1.
This polynomial has one stable and one unstable real root. The stable solution defines p∗SQ in (19).
Since an equilibrium in this regions requires that all Quixotes comply, the share of compliance in the
global population can be obtained as: y∗SQ = (1 + p∗SQ)/2. That is:
y∗SQ =
−(d− φ) +√(d− φ)2 + 2αεσ
2σ
, (23)
which is always positive and lower than 1. Furthermore, it lies within region IV or IIIα>1/2 if and
only if y∗SQ ≤ ∆1, which is satisfied under condition (18).
It is easy to show that condition (18), which guarantees the existence of this type of equilibrium, is
also a necessary and sufficient condition for the share of compliant Sanchos in (19) to be positive.
Moreover, p∗SQ is strictly lower than 1 as long as Quixotes play a snowdrift game, which occurs under
condition (11).
– Equilibrium under condition (20):
Whenever y < ∆, compliant Quixotes do not abandon compliance when paired with defecting
Quixotes, rQQCD = 0. Furthermore, since p = 0, the dynamics for the compliance share among Quixotes
reads:
q˙ = (1− q)qrQQDC − qrQSCD = qσ [(1− q)[∆− y]− (y −∆1)] .
Taking into account that now y = q/2, then q˙/(qσ) is given by the second order polynomial:
q2 − 2q [1 +∆] + 4∆− 2(1− α) ε
σ
.
The stable root for this polynomial is given in (21).
For this solution to be feasible, it must remain within regions IIIα<1/2 or II, i.e. y∗Q > ∆1. After
some algebra, it is easy to conclude that this inequality is equivalent to condition (20). It is also easy
to prove that this is also equivalent to q∗Q < 1.
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B Proof of Proposition 3
First, we compute the Jacobian matrix, J(p, q), of the system of differential equations within the region
where the equilibrium is located. Then we compute the two eigenvalues of J(p∗, q∗).
The equilibrium (p∗SQ, 1) which lies within region15 IIIα>1/2, has associated the two eigenvalues:
λ1SQ = (d− φ)− 2ε+
√
(d− φ)2 + 2αεσ,
λ2SQ = (d− φ)2 + 2αεσ − (σ + c− d)
√
(d− φ)2 + 2αεσ.
After some calculus, it is easy to see that λ1SQ < 0 is equivalent to:
ε > α
c− φ
2
+ (1− α)(d− φ).
But since α ∈ [0, 1], then from condition (18) it is immediate to conclude that ε > αε > (c − φ)/2 >
α(c− φ)/2. Hence condition above follows, and λ1SQ < 0.
Likewise, λ2SQ < 0 is equivalent to:
αεσ[2αε− 4(c− d)] < (d− φ)2[(c− d)− αε].
This condition can be proved based on the fact that p∗SQ ≤ 1 which, after some calculus, is equivalent to
2αε − 4(c − d) ≤ 0. Moreover, since αε ≤ ε < c − d, then it is immediately obvious that the LHS of
previous inequality is non-positive, while the RHS is positive, which concludes the proof of λ2SQ < 0.
The equilibrium (0, q∗Q ) which lies within region16 IIIα<1/2, has associated the two eigenvalues:
λ1Q =
1
4
{
−(c− d)− ε+
√
Dis
}
, Dis = (c− d)2 − 2αεσ − 2(d− φ)ε+ ε2,
λ2Q =
1
2σ
{
Dis− [σ + ε− (d− φ)]
√
Dis
}
.
It is easy to see that λ1Q < 0 is equivalent to:
−2αεσ − 2(d− φ)ε < 2ε(c− d).
The LHS in this inequality is negative and the RHS positive. Therefore, it always holds.
Finally, λ2Q < 0 can be equivalently written as αε− 2(d−φ) > −(c− d). But this condition is true
as long as q∗Q in (21) takes a positive value.
C Proof of Proposition 4
Under condition (20) the stable equilibrium is (0, q∗Q ), and the Nash equilibrium is (0, qNE). Obviously
pNE = p∗Q = 0. Moreover, taking into account (21) and (13), one gets that qNE > q∗Q if and only if:√
(1−∆)2 + 2(1− α)ε/σ > (1 +∆)− 2∆ = 1−∆,
which immediately holds.
Conversely, under condition (18) the stable equilibrium is (p∗SQ, 1), and the Nash equilibrium is
(0, qNE). From (18) immediately follows that p∗SQ > pNE = 0. However, from condition (18) and the
fact that α ∈ [0, 1] one gets:
ε ≥ αε > c− φ
2
.
This inequalities imply 2∆ > 1 and, taking into account (13), qNE = 1.
15 A similar analysis could be done if this equilibrium had lied in region IV.
16 A similar analysis could be done if this equilibrium had lied in region II.
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D Proof of Remark 3
It is easy to see that:
qNE < 1 if ε <
c− φ
2
, and qNE = 1 if ε ∈
(
c− φ
2
,
c− φ
2α
)
.
Thus, under condition (18), ε > αε > (c−φ)/2 and qNE = 1. The gap in the average payoff for Quixotes
between the asymptotically stable equilibrium and the Nash equilibrium reads:
p¯iQ(p∗SQ, 1)− p¯iQ(0, 1) =
dp∗SQ
2
> 0.
Under the alternative condition (20), although pNE = 0, qNE can be equal or lower than 1.
1. αε < ε < (c− φ)/2 and hence qNE < 1:
The gap in the average payoff for Sanchos between the asymptotically stable equilibrium and the Nash
equilibrium reads:
p¯iS(0, q∗Q )− p¯iS(0, qNE) =
1
2
(c− d+ φ)(q∗Q − qNE) < 0.
2. αε < (c− φ)/2 < ε and hence qNE = 1:
The gap in the average payoff for Sanchos between the asymptotically stable equilibrium and the Nash
equilibrium reads:
p¯iS(0, q∗Q )− p¯iS(0, 1) = −
1
2
σ(1− q∗Q ) < 0.
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